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THE SCHOOL OF LAW
A law symposium of two sessions, one in the morning and one
in the afternoon, will be held on Friday, June 6. Each session
will be devoted to a legal subject of interest to practicing lawyers.
In the evening the Law Alumni Association will hold its annual
banquet at the Edgewater Club.
In the 1941 summer session, June 16 to July 25, courses will
be offered in the following subjects: Criminal Law, Personal
Property, Constitutional Law, Damages, Federal Jurisdiction
and Procedure, and Equity.
NOTES
THE HUTCHESON CASE
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., a company engaged in manufacturing
and selling beer in interstate commerce, had an agreement with
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
and the International Association of Machinists under which all
disputes concerning the erection and dismantlement of machin-
ery in the company's plant were to be settled by arbitration.
In 1939, the carpenters' union claimed complete jurisdiction over
such work and refused to submit its demand to arbitration. To
force the employer's acceptance of its demand the carpenters'
union called strikes in the employer's plant, on a construction
job to enlarge the employer's facilities and on a construction job
to erect a new building for the employer's tenant, and conducted
a nation-wide boycott of the employer's product by means of
circular letters and articles in the official publication of the union.
The Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice secured
indictments against the officers of the carpenters' union on the
charge that the union's activities constituted a criminal combina-
tion and conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.1 The Su-
preme Court of the United States affirmed2 an order of the
United States District Court sustaining defendants' demurrers. 3
The majority of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, ruled that the area within which peaceful labor activities
are immune from prosecution under the Sherman Act can be
1. Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890) 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. (1927)
sees. 1-7.
2. United States v. Hutcheson (1941) 61 S. Ct. 463. Mr. Justice Murphy
took no part in the disposition of this case.
3. United States v. Hutcheson (D. C. E. D. Mo. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 600.
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determined only by examining the challenged conduct in the light
of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, in which
Congress has expressed public policy concerning labor activities.
So examined, it was held that the union's conduct did not vio-
late the anti-trust laws. Stone, J., concurred on the grounds
that the strikes did not and could not "operate to suppress com-
petition in the market of any product" and that peaceful picket-
ing and publication seeking a boycott were an exercise of free
speech, guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Roberts, J., with whom concurred Hughes, C. J.,
dissented on the ground that the union's conduct constituted a
secondary boycott affecting interstate commerce-an activity
which had repeatedly been held illegal by the Supreme Court.
BACKGROUND
The application of the anti-trust laws to labor unions has been
the subject of continuous debate since the enactment of the Sher-
man Act. Whether or not Congress inteded the Act to apply to
the activities of labor unions,4 the United States Supreme Court,
in the first labor case-the so-called "Danbury Hatters'" case -
to come before it under the Act decided that members of a labor
union were liable under the Sherman Act for activities carried
on by their union if those activities had a restraining effect upon
interstate trade or commerce. This decision was accomplished
by giving a strict grammatical interpretation to the word "every"
in section 1 of the Act. Three years later, the court, in Stand-
4. For the viewpoint that Sherman Act was not intended to apply to
union activities: Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930) 3-54; Boudin,
The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 1283, (1940)
40 Col. L. Rev. 14; Joseph, The Sherman Act-A Menace to Freedom (1928)
18 Amer. Labor Leg. Rev. 297, 298-299; Corwin, The Anti-Trust Acts and
the Constitution (1932) 18 Va. L. Rev. 355, 373-378; Shulman, Labor and
the Anti-Trust Laws (1940) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 769. For the viewpoint that
Sherman Act was intended to apply to union activities: Emery, Labor Or-
ganizations and the Sherman Act (1912) 70 Journal of Political Economy
599, 605-607; Thornton, A Treatise on the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1913)
25-28, 677-679; Mason, Organized Labor and the Law (1925) cc. 7, 8;
Miller, Anti-Trust Labor Problems: Law and Policy (1940) 7 Law and
Contemporary Problems 82; Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade:
The Apex Case (1941) 50 Yale L. J. 787. For the viewpoint that Congress
had no specific intent to include or exclude union activities: Landis, Book
Review (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 875; Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor
Injunction (1930) 8, n. 36.
5. Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 208 U. S. 274. The local Hatters' Union
struck against hat manufacturers, persuaded the national union and the
A. F. of L. to urge members to refuse to patronize in any way retail out-
lets handling the manufacturer's product. It is not entirely clear whether
the strike, the boycott, or both brought the conduct under the Sherman Act.
See Landis, The Apex Case (1941) 26 Cornell L. Q. 191, 196.
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ard Oil Co. v. United States," declared that in industrial cases
the word "every" did not mean "every" but meant "some"-
i. e., only unreasonable restraints.
The decision in the Danbury Hatters' case intensified labor's
agitation for legislative relief from the strictures of the Sher-
man Act as interpreted by the courts. This agitation culminated
in the passage of the Clayton Act.7 Section 6 of this Act pro-
vided that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce" and that nothing in the anti-trust laws
should be construed to prohibit the existence of labor organiza-
tions or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof;
nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws.
Section 20 prohibited the issuance of injunctions by federal
courts against specified activities arising out of a dispute con-
cerning terms or conditions of employment in any case between
"an employer and employees, or between employers and employ-
ees or between employees, or between persons employed and per-
sons seeking employment." This section further provided that
the described activities should not be held to be a violation of
any law of the United States.
Notwithstanding the hopes of labor that its Magna Carta had
been written," the Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Press Co.
27. Deering9 construed the Clayton Act so that labor found itself
in a position worse than that which it had occupied before the
'passage of the Act. By means of strict grammatical interpre-
tation, the majority of the Court nullified the Clayton Act by
enunciating the following doctrine: Section 6, as indicated by
the words "lawful" and "legitimate," does not permit any activ-
ity by labor organizations or their members which was not previ-
ously permissible. The first paragraph of section 20 is merely
declaratory and "puts into statutory form familiar restrictions
of the granting of injunctions". The second paragraph, however,
is an extraordinary restriction on the equity powers of-the courts
-and of course the courts must give full effect to the intent of
6. (1911) 221 U. S. 1.
7. Clayton Anti-Trust Act (1914) 38 Stat. 730, 15 U. S. C. A. (1927)
sec. 12.
8. Gompers, The Charter of Industrial Freedom-Labor Provisions of
the Clayton Anti-Trust Law (1914) 21 Amer. Federationists 957.
9. (1921) 254 U. S. 443.
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Congress-which requires, as Congress must have intended, an
absolutely literal interpretation of qualifying words. Thus the
specified exemptions must arise out of a dispute involving "terms
or conditions of unemployment"; this can only mean that there
must be an employer-employee relationship. If an employer-em-
ployee relationship is established, fellow unionists who are not
employees cannot receive immunization from injunction through
section 20, because that section contains no mention of "labor
organizations". These co-unionists must be controlled by section
6 (where labor organizations are mentioned), and this section
does not alter the Sherman Act. Consequently, a secondary boy-
cott is enjoinable. Moreover, it is enjoinable at the instance of
private parties because section 16 of the Clayton Act permits
such actions.10
Since the Duplex decision, labor cases have given rise to the
question of what conditions permit the application of anti-trust
laws to labor unions. The decisions are not logically reconcil-
able,1 but there are certain tests which have been applied either
in fact or in form in many of the decisions. It has been held
generally that the Sherman Act does not apply to a labor com-
bination if the restraint of interstate commerce is indirect, inci-
dental, and remote.12 On the other hand, if the restraint is direct,
10. See Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal (1917) 244 U. S. 459, holding that an
injunction could not be secured by private parties against a violation of the
Sherman Act. Mr. Justice Roberts in dissenting in the Hutcheson case
writes: "In 1908 this court held such a secondary boycott, instigated to
enforce the demands of a labor union against an employer, was a violation
of the Sherman Act and could be restrained at the suit of the employer."
Evidently Mr. Justice Roberts has reference to the restraining effort of a
damage suit and not to an equity proceeding.
11. "No rational principle of labor policy--except possibly the policy
that labor unions must not be strong--can harmonize the many decisions
of the federal courts in labor cases under the anti-trust laws." Shulman,
Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws (1940) 34 Ill. L. Rev. 769, 777.
12. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (First Coronado case)(1922) 259 U. S. 344; United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk
Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1922) 284 Fed. 446; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin(1933) 289 U. S. 103; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader (1940) 310 U. S. 469.
Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937) 301 U. S. 1;
N. L. R. B. v. Friedman Harry Marks Clothing Co. (1937) 301 U. S. 58.
It is now accepted that Congress did not in the Sherman Act exhaust itsjurisdiction over interstate commerce, but did in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (1935) 49 Stat. 449-457, c. 372, 29 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) secs.
151-166. Cases arising under the Sherman Act deal with the applicability
of the Act, whereas cases under the National Labor Relations Act deal
with the extent of constitutional power. See Brown, The Apex Case and
Its Effect Upon Labor Activities and the Anti-Trust Laws (1941) 21
Boston U. L. Rev. 48, 90; Gregory, The Sherman Act v. Labor (1941) 8
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 222, 233; 2 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bar-
gaining (1940) 1252, sec. 417.
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substantial, and material, the Act has been held to apply. 3 But
when is a restraint direct or indirect? Condemned labor re-
straints may be classified as arising out of one or more of three
types of situations.1 4
(1) If the activities of a union have been at the point of pro-
duction of goods destined for interstate commerce, the courts
have found a violation of the anti-trust laws when these activi-
ties were carried on with an intent to restrain interstate com-
merce.15 Evidence of this intent has been found in statements
made by union leaders, or appearing in union publications.17 It
has been deduced from the fact that the union's attempt to organ-
ize a wide area necessarily results in restraint of interstate com-
merce.1s Although the Supreme Court has specifically stated that
the mere fact of reduction in the amount of goods entering inter-
state commerce is not sufficient to invoke the Sherman Act,19 it
has allowed evidence of such reduction to show intent.2 0 For the
most part, the test of "intent" is subjective, and the process of
its application has led to utter confusion among the courts.21
(2) If the activities of a union have interfered with actual
transportation 22 or with instruments of transportation,23 lower
13. Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 208 U. S. 274; Coronado Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers of America (Second Coronado case) (1925) 268 U. S. 295;
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443; Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n (1927) 274 U. S. 37; United States
v. Brims (1926) 272 U. S. 549; International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States (1934) 291 U. S. 293.
14. Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930) 183.
15. "Intent to restrain commerce" must not be confused with the motive
of the union. The courts have not been concerned whether the motive or
objective of the union was in furtherance of its own interests, or whether
the end sought was socially and economically good or bad. Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n (1927) 274 U. S. 37; Boyle
v. United States (C. C. A. 7, 1919) 259 Fed. 803.
16. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers (1925) 268 U. S. 295;
Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1929)
35 F. (2d) 203.
17. Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers (D. C. E. D. Pa.
1929) 35 F. (2d) 203; United States v. Anderson (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 101
F. (2d) 325.
18. Borderland Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers (D. C. D. Ind. 1921)
275 Fed. 871; United Mine Workers v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co.
(C. C. A. 4, 1927) 18 F. (2d) 839; Pittsburgh Term. Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 559.
19. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 344;
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader (1940) 310 U. S. 469.
20. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers (1925) 268 U. S. 295.
21. For discussions of the "intent" test see: Brown, The Apex Case and
Its Effect Upon Labor Activities and the Anti-Trust Laws (1941) 21 Boston
U. L. Rev. 48, 52-80; Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930) 235;
Comment (1941) 35 Ill. L. Rev. 424.
22. The following cases arose out of the Pullman strike: United States
19411 NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
380 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26
federal courts have invoked the Sherman Act on the slightest
pretext.2 4 The Supreme Court has not ruled on any case falling
directly within this classification,25 but it has enunciated the doc-
trine that the Sherman Act was not enacted to police interstate
transportation.26 Lower federal courts, however, have given
great weight to acts of violence in determining the existence of
a conspiracy to restrain interstate shipment of goods. 27
(3) If there has been an interference with the goods at the
point of destination or consumption, the courts have generally
found a violation of the anti-trust laws. Here, as in cases of
interference with production, the "intent" test has been applied;
but the existence of a "secondary boycott ' 28 or "sympathetic
v. Elliot (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1894) 64 Fed. 27; Thomas v. Cincinnati N. 0.
& T. P. Ry. (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1894) 62 Fed. 803; United States v. Agler(C. C. D. Ind. 1894) 62 Fed. 824; United States v. Cassidy (D. C. N. D.
Cal. 1895) 67 Fed. 698; United States v. Debs (C. C. N. D. III. 1894) 64
Fed. 724. United States v. Workingmen's Amalgam. Council (C. C. E. D.
La. 1893) 54 Fed. 994 (sympathetic strike by draymen); United States v.
Railway Employees' Dept. (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1922) 283 Fed. 479 (strike
arising out of grievance over working conditions); O'Brien v. United States(C. C. A. 6, 1923) 290 Fed. 185 (truck driver transporting single billet of
steel forced by pickets to return billet to shipping plant) ; United States v.
Harvel (D. C. W. D. La. 1923), Federal Antitrust Laws (1938) 195 (strik-
ers assaulted roadmaster); Buyer v. Guillan (C. C. A. 2, 1921) 271 Fed.
65 (refusal of dock workers to handle goods transported to docks by non-
union truckmen).
23. Williams v. United States (C. C. A. 5, 1923) 295 Fed. 302 (quick-
silver put in boiler of engine); Vandell v. United States (C. C. A. 2, 1925)
6 F. (2d) 188 (track dynamited): United States v. Powell (D. C. E. D. Ky.
1922), The Federal Antitrust Laws (1938) 194 (freight cars loaded with
coal set on fire). Contra: United States v. Hency (D. C. N. D. Tex. 1923)
286 Fed. 165 (quicksilver put in boiler of engine which was not then at-
tached to train).
24. United States v. Taliaferro (D. C. W. D. Va. 1922) 290 Fed. 214,
220 (Barber found guilty of contempt for violating injunction by placing
in shop window a sign reading "No scabs wanted here."): "It is contended
that this court had authority to enjoin only acts which restrained inter-
state commerce * * * . * * * it seems to me that the act of molesting,
annoying and insulting numbers of those who are working for, or are
desirous of working for, an interstate carrier, during a wide spread strike,
has an all-sufficient tendency to restrict interstate transportation * * * to
fully justify an injunction." Aff'd Taliaferro v. United States (C. C. A.
4, 1923) 290 Fed. 906.
25. In re Debs (1895) 158 U. S. 564, involved the question of interfer-
ence with transportation but the court did not rely on the Sherman Act.
26. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader (1940) 310 U. S. 469. Accord: United
States v. Hency (D. C. N. D. Tex. 192S) 286 Fed. 165, 171: "The Sherman
Law punishes those who combine in restraint of trade and not for sabotage."
27. See notes 22 and 23, supra. Cf. United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 344 (murder and arson); Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader (1940) 310 U. S. 469 (destruction of property during sit-down
strike).
28. There has been considerable confusion arising out of the use of the
term "secondary boycott." For criticisms see Frankfurter and Greene, The
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strike" has been held sufficient to evince the required intent to
restrain commerce. Agreements, arising from union rules or
from contracts with employers, directed toward stabilizing em-
ployment conditions by such means as prohibiting members from
working on non-union products29 or with non-union laborers,30
or from buying non-union products3 ' have, with a few notable
exceptions,3 2 been found illegal.
Uncertainties of the law,33 gross misinterpretations of the
Clayton Act,34 the inequalities of the rules applied to industrial
Use of Injunctions in American Labor Controversies (1928) 44 L. Q. Rev.
164, 195; Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes (1932) 38. For a
discussion of the identical effect upon interstate commerce of a strike at
point of production and boycott at point of destination see Gregory, The
Sherman Act v. Labor (1941) 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 222.
29. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443; Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n (1927) 274 U. S. 37;
United States v. Brims (1926) 272 U. S. 549; Boyle v. United States
(C. C. A. 7, 1919) 259 Fed. 803; Columbus Heating & Vent. Co. v. Pitts-
burgh Bldg. Trades Council (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 806;
Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1927)
18 F. (2d) 333. Contra: United States v. Gold (C. C. A. 2, 1940) 115 F.
(2d) 236.
30. Aeolian Co. v. Fischer (C. C. A. 2, 1930) 40 F. (2d) 189.
31. Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 208 U. S. 274; Fehr Baking Co. v. Bakers'
Union (D. C. W. D. La. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 691.
32. National Ass'n of Window Glass Manufacturers v. United States
(1923) 263 U. S. 403. A constitutional provision of the Painters, Decora-
tors, and Paperhangers of America provides that if a local contractor
employing union men, engages in work outside of the locality covered by
the agreement he must pay the higher of either the prevailing wage in the
locality in which the job is to be done or the prevailing wage in the locality
covered by the agreement. Wage agreements incorporating this provision
have been held not to violate the anti-trust laws: Barker Painting Co. v.
Brotherhood of Painters (C. C. A. 3, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 16; Barker Painting
Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters (App. D. C. 1927) 23 F. (2d) 743; Ram-
busch Decorating Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters (C. C. A. 2, 1939) 105
F. (2d) 134. Contra: J. I. Hass, Inc. v. Local Union No. 17 (D. C. Conn.
1924) 300 Fed. 894.
33. "Another test of the uncertainty attendant upon the cases under the
act is the extent to which the district courts, the circuit courts of appeals,
and the Supreme Court have disagreed with each other in interpreting the
law. In six cases the circuit courts of appeals reversed the judgments of
district courts. Eight times the Supreme Court reversed the decisions of
the courts below. This last is especially significant in view of the fact
that there have only been ten decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in
labor cases under the statute." Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930)
225.
34. Amidon, J., in Great Northern Ry. v. Brosseau (D. C. D. N. D. 1923)
286 Fed. 414, 420: "Notwithstanding the legislative history of the statute,
and its highly remedial character, as indicated by its history and the reports
of the committees having it in charge, many lower federal courts have studi-
ously striven to disregard its plain language, as well as the actual intent
of Congress, as disclosed by the history of the statute. Some have held
that all strikes cause irreparable injury, and therefore the employer is
entitled to an injunction to prevent such injury. Other courts have gone
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combinations compared with those applied to labor combina-
tions,35 and the dramatic situations portrayed in the Duplex0
and the Bedfordd8-7 cases, led to growing demands on the part of
labor and the public that Congress once again curtail judicial
interpretation of the anti-trust laws. The result was the Norris-
LaGuardia Act which, in unequivocal language, withdraws from
the federal courts the power to issue injunctions against specified
labor activities arising out of a labor dispute38 unless these activi-
ties are accompanied by violence or fraud,89 and even then a
designated procedure must be followed.40 Early interpretation
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act regarded it as a procedural with-
drawal of the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions
so far as to hold that the entire statute was a trick by Congress to so
frame the measure that one part of it would nullify the other. Other
courts have said there was no such thing as peaceful picketing, and hence
no such thing as peaceful persuasion, and therefore the plain language
of the statute must be disregarded by the court, and all picketing and all
attempts by strikers to exercise their rights of peaceful persuasion were
to be restrained, and injunctions have accordingly issued. Other courts, not-
withstanding the specific language of the last clause of section 20 that the
doing of the acts which it permits should not be held to be in conflict with
any federal law, have restrained strikes upon the ground that they violated
the Sherman Anti-Trust Law and statutes forbidding the obstruction of
the United States mails.
"In my judgment, all such action by courts is a gross abuse of judicial
power, and a direct refusal on their part to obey a statute which was
intended to limit their powers. It may be that the statute is economically
and socially unwise, because of the vast injuries which strikes inflict upon
society. Those considerations, however, are for Congress and not for the
courts."
35. 1 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) 563, sec.
190; Frey, The Double Standard in Applying the Sherman Act (1928) 18
Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 302. "The Sherman Law was held in United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32, to permit capitalists to combine
in * * * [one] corporation practically the whole shoe machine industry of
the country, necessarily giving it a position of dominance over shoe-manu-
facturing in America. It would indeed, be strange if Congress had by the
same Act willed to deny to members of a small craft of workingmen the
right to cooperate in simply refraining from work, when that course was
the only means of self-protection against a combination of militant and
powerful employers. I cannot believe that Congress did so." Brandeis, J.,
dissenting in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n(1927) 274 U. S. 37, 65.
36. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443.
37. Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n (1927)
274 U. S. 37.
38. Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932) 47 Stat. 70, c. 90, sec. 1, 29 U. S.
C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 101. "Labor dispute" is defined: Norris-LaGuardia
Act (1932) 47 Stat. 73, c. 90, sec. 13, 29 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) sec. 113.
39. Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932) 47 Stat. 70, c. 90, see. 4, 29 U. S. C. A.(Supp. 1940) sec. 104.
40. Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932) 47 Stat. 71, 72, c. 90, secs. 7, 8, 29
U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) 107, 108.
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and not as an alteration of the substantive law. Thus, actions
against labor unions continued on the non-injunctive front. The
Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice commenced a
drive to eliminate certain labor union activities which that Divi-
sion felt to have a restraining effect on interstate commerce.41
It was out of this drive that the instant case arose. At the same
time, the Supreme Court had before it the Apex case,42 which
was a suit for treble damages arising out of a sit-down strike,
which was accompanied with violence and a refusal by the union
to allow the manufacturer to ship $800,000 worth of finished
hosiery, 80 per cent of which was destined to meet unfilled orders
in points out of the state. There the court, with Procrustean
determination, fitted a new doctrine over its own past interpre-
tations of the anti-trust laws, and found that those activities
did not constitute a conspiracy in restraint of trade and com-
merce. The test which the court enunciated was that in order
for the activities of a labor union to constitute a "direct" re-
straint there must be a "showing of some form of market control
of a commodity, such as to monopolize the supply, control its
price, or discriminate between its would-be purchasers. ' 4 3 But
41. In a letter written to the secretary of the Central Labor Union of
Indianapolis, Mr. Arnold set forth the Justice Department's policy in union
cases under the anti-trust laws:
"The types of unreasonable restraints against which we have recently
proceeded or are now proceeding illustrate concretely the practices which
in our opinion are unquestionable violations of the Sherman Act, supported
by no responsible judicial authority whatever.
"1. Unreasonable restraints designed to prevent the use of cheaper mate-
rial, improved equipment, or more efficient methods.
"2. Unreasonable restraints designed to compel the hiring of useless and
unnecessary labor.
"3. Unreasonable restraints designed to enforce systems of graft and
extortion.
"4. Unreasonable restraints designed to enforce illegally fixed prices.
"5. Unreasonable restraints designed to destroy an established and legiti-
mate system of collective bargaining." (1939) 5 Labor Relations Rep. 316.
For a penetrating analysis of this letter see 8 1. J. A. Bull. 53.
42. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader (1940) 310 U. S. 469. The literature
on this case is already voluminous: Brown, The Apex Case and Its Effect
Upon Labor Activities and the Anti-Trust Laws (1941) 21 Boston U. L.
Rev. 48; Gregory, The Sherman Act v. Labor (1941) 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
222; Cavers, Labor v. Sherman Act (1941) 8. U. of Chi. L. Rev. 246;
Landis, The Apex Case (1941) 26 Cornell L. Q. 191; Steffen, Labor Activi-
ties in Restraint of Trade: The Apex Case (1941) 50 Yale L. J. 787; Note
(1940) 8. I. J. A. Bull. 125.
43. This test has been criticized on the ground that it would permit the
large manufacturer and producer to invoke the Sherman Act by reason of
the large proportion of production which they control, while it would give
the small producer no protection. See Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint
of Trade: The Apex Case (1941) 50 Yale L. J. 787, 820; Cavers, Labor v.
The Sherman Act (1941) 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 246, 254; Gregory, The
Sherman Act v. Labor (1941) 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 222, 236.
19411 NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
384 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26
this test also permits a price increase if that increase results
from the elimination of price competition based on differences
in labor standards. 4
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Perhaps the most striking feature of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in the Hutcheson case is the judicial process which he
used to arrive at his conclusion. The essence of this process is
that without the restriction placed by the Duplex case upon sec-
tion 20 of the Clayton Act,45 the activities of the defendants in
the instant case would not be subject to an injunction. Congress,
in passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act, rendered a legislative dis-
approval of this judicial interpretation of section 20 and placed
its own meaning on that section.46
But to argue * * * that the Duplex case still governs for
purposes of a criminal prosecution is to say that that which
on the equity side of the court is allowable conduct may in
a criminal proceeding become the road to prisonY7 * * *
44. Labor standards include more than mere wage differentiation; there
are increased costs to the employer in providing sanitary conditions, reduc-
ing hours, abolishing speed-up systems, etc.
45. "It had, unfortunately, not been sufficiently noticed by commentators
that prior understanding of the Duplex and Bedford restrictions upon
Section 20 privileges had, sub silento, undergone sharp revision. For one
thing, the Tri-City case, decided in the very term of the Duplex decision,
granted the privileges of Section 20 not only to actual strikers but also
to members of the defendant unions who were neither former nor pros-
pective employees of the complaining employer. * * * Again, the right to
picket and publicise have lately been held to be 'within that liberty of
communication which is secured to every person' by the Constitution [Thorn-
hill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U. S. 88]. Finally, the opinion of Mr. Justice
Stone in the Apex * * * case served notice that because of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act the door was open for reconsideration of the scope of the
privileges defined in Section 20 of the Clayton Act." Note, Labor Under
the Hutcheson Decision (1941) 9 I. J. A. Bull. 85, 94.
46. H. R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
is extraordinarily equipped to give the intent on this matter, he collaborated
in drafting the Norris-LaGuardia Act, S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong. 1st Sess.
See, Note (1941) 9 I. J. A. Bull. 85, 95.
47. For a criticism of this statement see Landis, The Apex Case, Adden-
dum (1941) 26 Cornell L. Q. 191, 212C: "Traditionally, however, equity
does not normally determine whether conduct is 'allowable' or not; it deter-
mines whether under the circumstances its extraordinary powers shall be
exercised to grant relief of the nature requested or whether the parties
shall be left to such remedies as they possess upon the law side of the court.
And the 'law side' may in innumerable cases treat as criminal that for
which injunctive relief is denied. This, moreover, was the great issue
underlying the battle over government by injunction in labor disputes,
namely that procedurally injunctive relief was unfairly administered to
labor in this class of cases and that, therefore, the injunctive mode of relief
should be curtailed and complaining parties left to whatever remedies, legal
or criminal, might otherwise be available."
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That is not the way to read the will of Congress, particu-
larly when expressed by a statute which * * * is practically
and historically one of a series of enactments touching one
of the most sensitive national problems. Such legislation
must not be read in a spirit of mutilating narrowness.4 8
Thus the court adopted the position that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act restored the broad purpose of the Clayton Act, and that it
removed from the specified activities enumerated in section 20
the taint of being a violation of any law of the United States.49
The effect of this reasoning is that the Court must overrule
the Duplex and the Bedford decisions (both injunction cases)
because Congress did so; and with the demise of these decisions
must go their interpretation of the Clayton Act. Thus the Court
must now reconsider the Clayton Act as interpreted by Congress
and without the "shreds of a discarded judicial interpretation
still clinging to it and narrowing its scope. 59
This method of judicial construction is a healthy recognition
of the fact that it is the job of the legislature to determine gov-
ernmental policy and that it is the job of the courts to recognize
the spirit of that policy as long as it is not actually inconsistent
48. United States v. Hutcheson (1941) 61 S. Ct. 463, 469.
49. Criticism has been leveled at making the application of the Sherman
Act hinge upon the scope of "labor dispute" as defined in the Norris-La-
Guardia Act. The contention is that the Norris-LaGuardia Act allows in-junctions where there is not a "labor dispute" (United States v. Brims
(1926) 272 U. S. 549, is cited as an example). And even where there is a
"labor dispute" the Act permits injunctions if there is violence or fraud;
thus "sporadic 'illegal means' of a few individuals may make criminal
otherwise lawful activity." (O'Brien v. United States (C. C. A. 6, 1923)
290 Fed. 185, and United States v. Norris (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1918) 255
Fed. 423, are cited as examples.) Landis, The Apex Case, Addendum (1941)
26 Cornell L. Q. 191, 212E. This contention is not as valid as might appear
at first glance. There is no guarantee that the Biims case would not be
considered a labor dispute if it were now presented to the court for deci-
sion, Gregory, The New Sherman-Clayton-Norris-LaGuardia Act (1941) 8
U. of Chi. L. Rev. 503, 515. Concerning the violence and fraud cases, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932) 47 Stat. 71, c. 90, sec. 6, 29 U. S. C. A.
(Supp. 1940) 106, provides that no organization or officer or member of an
organization is responsible for unlawful acts by individuals unless there
is actual authorization or ratification. Also see Terrio v. S. N. Nielsen
Const. Co. (D. C. E. D. La. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 77, 79: "The assault by
Manny Moore is an individual act, not chargeable to any of the defendants.
Even if it were chargeable to the defendants, it would not be an act in
furtherance of restraint of trade. It would constitute an unlawful act under
the criminal laws against committing assaults." Moreover, the Hutcheson
case does not reject the test of substantial market control laid down in
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader (1940) 310 U. S. 469, where there was vio-
lence. This would seem to indicate that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not
exhaust immunity from the Sherman Act.
50. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., Inc. (1937)
300 U. S. 342, 344.
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with constitutional provisions. The extent to which the courts
have, by narrow interpretation, throttled and made ineffective
many legislative attempts to adjust our political structure to the
realities of our complex economic and social life has been pointed
out many times.51 Mr. Justice Frankfurter has himself applied
to the judicial interpretation of the anti-trust laws the French
cynicism, "the more things are legislatively changed, the more
they remain the same judicially". 2 But the process of judicial
construction found in the Hutcheson case is not new to the anti-
trust laws. In the First Coronado case,53 Mr. Chief Justice Taft,
by recognizing the considerable amount of legislation granting
labor unions status before the law, abandoned the common law
principle that such unincorporated associations were not suable
entities and found that there was a legislative intent to give
such organizations legal liabilities and privileges and decided
that they could therefore be sued. There has been a noticeable
tendency recently to recognize, by this method, the "equity of
the statute"5" in non-labor cases. 5
To those who fear the possible consequences of the judiciary's
allowing full expression to the spirit of legislative policy, four
assurances might be given: First, the necessity for the applica-
tion of this doctrine is limited. Second, although the doctrine
may lead conceivably to some dangerous situations, it cannot be
escaped,
because times, relations, things change, and cannot be fore-
seen by human intellect; nor is it given to any man to pro-
vide for all cases already existing, or to use language which
51. Cohen, Law and the Social Order (1933) 112; Fraenkel, Judicial
Interpretation of Labor Laws (1939) 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 577.
52. Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) 176.
53. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 344,
385-392. Compare United States v. Corrozzo (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1941) 3
C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. par. 60,282, in which Judge Sullivan follows the
same reasoning found in the instant case. This case was decided three days
before United States v. Huteheson.
54. For an excellent treatment of the history and use of this doctrine,
see Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, Harvard Legal Essays (1934)
213.
55. Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., Inc. (1937) 300 U. S. 342 (statu-
tory cause of action in favor of personal representative of deceased sea-
man did not abate on death of sole beneficiary); Keifer and Keifer v.
Reconstruction Finance Corp. (1939) 306 U. S. 381 (Although no authority
was specifically given, the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation has
authority to sue and be sued because Congress has manifested an attitude
by uniformly granting amenability to law of such corporations); Federal
Housing Admin. v. Burr (1940) 309 U. S. 242 (F. H. A. subject to garnish-
ment); Johnson v. United States (C. C. A. 1, 1908) 163 Fed. 30 (bank-
rupt's schedules are in the nature of pleadings).
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shall leave no doubt. Many things are dangerous, yet we
cannot dispense with them nevertheless.50
Third, such a procedure at its worst can be no more pernicious
than the full sway of judge-made law. Fourth, the electorate has
recourse through the legislature to reject any excesses in which
the judiciary might engage. The judiciary will be sensitive to
the will of the legislature by the very definition of the doctrine.
EFFECT OF DECISION
The decision in the Hutcheson case does not exempt labor
unions entirely from prosecution under the anti-trust laws. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not com-
bine with non-labor groups [United States v. Brims is cited
in a footnote as an example] the licit and the illicit under
Sec. 20 are not to be distinguished from any judgment re-
garding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrong-
ness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the
particular union activities are the means.57
This sentence, with its accompanying footnote,58 will lead to
much debate and to no little litigation. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
really introduced the question of the extent to which a union
or a group of unions may mutually cooperate and agree with an
employer or an association of employers to stabilize employment
conditions in any particular industry. Not all commerce-restrain-
ing agreements between employers and unions are illegal per se59
What agreements are legal? The answer cannot be found readily
or immediately, but some possible situations can be considered.
Agreements between employers and unions can be classified into
three groups.
56. Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics (3d ed. 1880) 53.
57. United States v. Hutcheson (1941) 61 S. Ct. 463, 466.
58. United States v. Brims (1926) 272 U. S. 549. Union millwork manu-
facturers in Chicago, because of the difference between union and non-union
labor standards, were being undersold by non-union manufacturers located
in other states. As a result, Chicago manufacturers had to reduce opera-
tions. In order to maintain employment and union standards, the union
made an agreement with the manufacturers whereby the employers would
employ only union carpenters and the union members would work only on
union-made millwork. The case has been criticised for not applying the rule
of reason: Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act (1930) 164. Such agree-
ments are not uncommon in collective bargaining contracts, Lieberman, The
Collective Labor Agreement (1939) 185-187.
59. National Ass'n of Window Glass Manufacturers v. United States
(1923) 263 U. S. 403. One may wonder why Mr. Justice Frankfurter did
not cite this case along with the Brims case.
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1. Agreements which have as their purpose the elimination of
cost differences arising out of the variance between union
and non-union working conditions.
The federal courts have recognized, either directly or by apply-
ing the "labor dispute" concept, that the continued existence
of unions is dependent upon their ability to raise and main-
tain standards of working conditions, and that this ability de-
pends to a considerable extent upon the elimination of non-
union 0 or extra-union6 ' competition. The methods to which
unions may resort in order to eliminate such competition are
limited. They may endeavor to organize the non-union employees
by direct organizational activitiy and by creating local pressure
through picketing and publicity to force the employer to bargain
with a union. If, for various reasons, a union cannot prosecute
an organizational campaign successfully at the point of produc-
60. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council (1921)
257 U. S. 184; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader (1940) 310 U. S. 469, 503:
"Since, in order to render a labor combination effective it must eliminate
the competition from non-union made goods, * * * an elimination of price
competition based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any
national labor organization. But this effect on competition has not been
considered to be the kind of curtailment of price competition prohibited by
the Sherman Act." Also United States v. Gold (C. C. A. 2, 1940) 115 F.(2d) 236. Contra: Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgam. Clothing Workers (D. C.
E. D. Pa. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 203 (Union enjoined from pursuing campaign
to organize non-union plants in Philadelphia in order to protect wage scale
of union plants in New York).
See Restatement, Torts (1939) sec. 803: "Employees who strike against
an employer who uses in his business goods or services produced by, or
furnishes goods or services to or on behalf of, a third person whose em-
ployees are engaged in a labor dispute with him for a proper object or are
not members of a labor union satisfactory to the actors are not liable to
the employer or to the third person if the actors have a substantial inter-
est in the third person's employment relations."
61. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products (1940)
311 U. S. 91; Fur Workers' Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers' Union
(App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 1, aff'd per curiam (1940) 208 U. S. 522;
Blankenship v. Kurfman (C. C. A. 7, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 450; Lund v.
Woodenware Workers' Union (D. C. D. Minn. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 607; Terrio
v. S. N. Nielsen Const. Co. (D. C. E. D. La. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 77. The
American Law Institute takes the position that "Jurisdictional disputes as
to whether particular work be done by one craft rather than another"
should be no more illegal than other labor activities directed towards the
"Maintenance or change of terms of employment relating to hours, wages,
working conditions or other perquisites or duties of employees * ** " Re-
statement, Torts (1939) sec. 784, comment d. Contra: Union Premier Food
Stores v. Retail Food C. and M. Union (C. C. A. 3, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 821;
Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1937) 21
F. Supp. 20; Consolidated Term. Corp. v. Drivers, C. and H. Local (D. C.
D. C. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 645; United States v. Drivers, C. and H. Local(D. C. D. C. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 594. See Jaffe, Inter-Union Disputes in
Search of a Forum (1940) 49 Yale L. J. 424.
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tion, it may resort to activities at the point of destination or con-
sumption and occasionally while goods are in transit. This may
lead to a reduction in the non-union employer's market and thus
tend to force him to unionize in order to have a market for his
products. Notwithstanding a substantial body of judicial deci-
sions that such activities interfering with products in transit or
at the point of destination violate the Sherman Act,6 2 these deci-
sions must now be reconsidered in the light of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act and the Hutcheson case. The federal courts, fol-
lowing Congressional definition, have given a broad meaning to
the term "labor dispute.' ' 13 Applying the construction followed
in the instant case, these activities, which are not enjoinable un-
der the Norris-LaGuardia Act, are not violative of any law of
the United States. Now if union workmen can and do refuse
to work on non-union or extra-union material or with non-union
workmen, what provision should be made for such a refusal in
a collective bargaining contract with an employer or an associa-
tion of employers? The employer, desiring to secure every pos-
sible guarantee that there be no interruption of work due to
strikes, would probably seek a no-strike clause. The union, see-
ing that such a clause would prevent striking in the event that
the employer should utilize non-union products or employ non-
union workmen, would make a counter-offer that the employer
operate a union or closed shop and refuse to handle non-union
products. Although such a counter-offer, should it become a part
of the contract, would restrain interstate commerce and would
increase prices by eliminating non-union standards, reason indi-
cates that it would not violate the anti-trust laws.
If an employer is hesitant about signing a contract with a
62. See notes 29, 30, and 31, supra.
63. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. (1938) 303 U. S. 552
(picketing against employer who secured practically all his patronage from
negroes but refused to employ negroes); Lauf v. Shinner and Co. (1938)
303 U. S. 323 (picketing in absence of a strike); Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products (1940) 311 U. S. 91 (picketing,
allegedly in violation of Sherman Act, retail stores which purchased milk
pursuant to the "vendor system" operated by plaintiff dairies under con-
tract with another union); Wilson and Co. v. Birl (C. C. A. 3, 1939) 105
F. (2d) 948 (mass picketing with misleading banners to obtain a closed
shop agreement); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin (C. C. A. 2, 1934)
71 F. (2d) 284 (threatening to strike if owners or contractors let sub-
contracts to members of a trade association which operated on an open-shop
basis); Diamond Full Fashioned Hosiery Co. v. Leader (D. C. E. D. Pa.
1937) 20 F. Supp. 467 (picketing closed plant to secure employment);
Green v. Obergfell (App. D. C. 1941) 8 Labor Relations Rep. 141 (brewery
workers' union refused injunction to restrain teamsters' union and A. F.
of L. from carrying out decision of A. F. of L. that drivers in brewery
industry come under jurisdiction of teamsters' union). See note 61, supra.
1941] NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
390 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26
union because he fears that he cannot compete with non-union
products selling at a lower price, can the union assure him,
either orally or in a contract, that it too is concerned about such
competition and that its members are not going to work on non-
union material or with non-union workmen? Provided that the
union does not refuse absolutely to bargain with the employer
unless he does join the trade association, can the union suggest
that the employer join such an organization and participate in a
joint contract negotiated by the union and the trade association?
Of if a group of employers claim that individually they cannot
establish or maintain the union scale, although they are other-
wise willing to recognize the union, can the union suggest that
by forming an association for the purpose of negotiating jointly
and enforcing a single contract, employers can reduce the cost
of unionizing and enjoy the additional advantage of assurance
that there will be no resultant underselling from the differences
in union and non-union scales, at least to the extent of the mem-
bership in their trade association?6" Close scrutiny reveals that
none of the above procedures would result in any degree of
market control over commodities, except for price differentiation
that might result from the difference between union and non-
union standards, and that none of them involve the use of any
forbidden activities, and that therefore none of them would be
violative of the anti-trust laws.
2. Agreements which have as their purpose the stabilizing
of employment.
These agreements will arise primarily if there are technologi-
cal developments which disrupt existing working conditions, or
if economic booms and depressions create problems of job adjust-
ment. In United States v. National Association of Window Glass
Manufacturers,6 5 the Supreme Court had before it a case which
falls into this classification. The hand-blown window glass in-
dustry had been, for a quarter of a century, a dying industry
because of the development of machine made glass, costing only
half as much to produce and selling at the same price. During
this period, the labor supply seriously diminished because new
workmen were not willing to undergo the required years of ap-
prenticeship in order to attain a skill with such a doubtful future.
64. Cf. Restatement, Torts (1939) sec. 793: "An employer's consenting
to become, remain or cease to be a member of an association of employers
is not a proper object of concerted action by workers when they do not
reasonably believe that his membership or non-membership in the associa-
tion will aid a collective interest of the workers."
65. (1923) 263 U. S. 403.
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Consequently, there was not a sufficient number of workmen to
operate fully the various factories during the working season,
and operation without a complete force of workmen would result
in serious loss to employers. To stabilize employment and to
enable the various factories to operate on the most efficient basis,
the manufacturers and the union entered into an agreement
whereby the available labor supply was apportioned to a part
of the plants for a portion of the working season, and to the
remainder of the plants for the rest of the season. The Supreme
Court, realizing the economic conditions of the industry and the
social advantage of stabilized employment gained by the agree-
ment, held that this was not an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Although the agreement in this case prolonged the life of an
industry which did not have the power to affect prices, the test
of "reasonableness" applied here should be used in all cases in-
volving attempts to reduce the shock of changing employment
conditions. Unions have an interest in the introduction of im-
proved equipment and more efficient methods in an industry, not
only from the negative viewpoint of the losses that members will
suffer by such introductions, but also from the positive view-
point of the workmen's share in the gains to be derived from
improved methods."3 Changes of equipment and methods are a
proper subject for collective bargaining, and any agreement in-
corporating such adjustments in it should be measured by its
"reasonableness," the court taking into consideration the eco-
nomic benefits of continued employment, the economic appro-
priateness of the introduction of new devices, and the social obli-
gation of industry as a whole to society.
3. Agreements which have as their purpose the estabIishment of
monopolistic .practices.
(a) Where an employer or an association of employers initiates
monopolistic practices.
An association of employers and a union may agree that the
union members will not work on non-union products and that
members of the association will operate on a closed shop basis.
The union may only intend to affect the labor cost factor, but the
association may go further, taking advantage of the union's boy-
cott of non-union products, and engage in price fixing, collusive
bidding, et cetera.07 Or, a union may agree to bargain only with
66. Lieberman, The Collective Labor Agreement (1939) 134, 146; Note,
The Folk-Law of Thurman Arnold (1939) 8 I. J. A. Bull. 53, 63.
67. See United States v. International Fur Workers' Union (C. C. A. 2,
1938) 100 F. (2d) 541, cert. denied (1938) 306 U. S. 653. In this case,
however, there was evidence of the union's complicity in the conspiracy to
engage in monopolistic practices.
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employers who are members of an association and to exert eco-
nomic pressure upon non-member employers by boycotting their
products. If non-member employers will not be admitted to the
association, or will be admitted only upon conditions that vio-
late the anti-trust laws or upon conditions which the union does
not reasonably believe will benefit a collective interest of the
union's members, the labor union becomes a strong arm of the
trade association." If the alleged illegal activities are initiated
by employers and the union gains only such benefits as are rea-
sonable incidents of collective bargaining agreements, the legal-
ity of such combinations should be tested by their "reasonable-
ness" in an action brought against the employers.
(b) Where a union or a council of unions initiates monopolistic
practices.
Under the guise of unionism, a group of employees or leaders
of a group of employees may foster racketeering activities to
extort money or advantages which are not reasonable incidents
of collective bargaining agreements. Persons who participate in
such activities should certainly be prosecuted-but not under the
anti-trust laws. There are adequate laws under which such ac-
tivities can be prosecuted, 69 and these laws, not the anti-trust
laws, should be utilized.
The above classification is by no means exhaustive; it is in-
tended only to suggest some of the necessary considerations for
determining whether a combination entered into by employers
and unions comes within the pale of anti-trust law prohibitions.
A number of combinations have been condemned by the federal
courts,7 0 but the use of these cases as precedents is of dubious
68. Local 167 v. United States (1934) 291 U. S. 293. It has been held
that there is not a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act where a union engages in activities to fix prices, Scavenger
Service Corp. v. Courtney (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 825, or to enforce
collusive bidding, Converse v. Highway Const. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1939) 107
F. (2d) 127.
69. Anti-Racketeering Act (1934) 48 Stat. 979, 18 U. S. C. A. (Supp.
1940) sees. 420a-420e. See Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business (1940)
248: "There may be assault, murder, trespass and anything else. But the
Sherman Act is not designed to take the place of state and municipal
government. It must not be used as a vortex into which are whirled all
forms of law enforcement. Both as theoretical and as a practical matter,
local policing of violence, trespass, appropriation of property, etc., should
be left to local police."
70. In Local 167 v. United States (1934) 291 U. S. 293, poultry market-
men organized a Chamber of Commerce to increase prices and allocate re-
tailers. Members of Local 167 agreed not to handle poultry for recalcitrant
marketmen, and members of Shoctim agreed to refuse to slaughter. The
Chamber of Commerce hired men to spy upon and to prevent by acts of
violence dealers from not conforming. In United States v. Painters Dist.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss3/8
value now. Some of them were decided under the interpretation
given to the Clayton Act by the Duplex case.7' They should now
be reconsidered in the light of the market control test of the
Apex case, the rule of construction found in the instant case, and
the national policy, expressed in the National Labor Relations
Act, favoring collective bargaining.
Instead of taking his cue from the rule of construction found
in the Hutcheson case, Mr. Thurman Arnold is now adopting the
mantle which the court has cast aside. The Anti-Trust Division
has dismissed only one case since the Hutcheson decision. In an-
nouncing the dismissal of this case, Mr. Arnold said :72
It is difficult to see any economic justification for this result
[losses occurring to an employer from a jurisdictional dis-
pute] .73 Nevertheless as we read the case of United States
Council No. 14 (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 58, aff'd per curiam
(1931) 284 U. S. 582, the painters' union refused to work on finished fix-
tures, kitchen cabinets and woodwork. In Boyle v. United States (C. C. A.
7, 1919) 259 Fed. 803, switchboard manufacturers agreed to unionize and
union agreed to boycott and strike on jobs using non-union material. In
Belfi v. United States (C. C. A. 3, 1919) 259 Fed. 822, there was a written
contract that tile dealers' association would employ only union workmen
and that members of tile setters' union would give preference to requests
made by members of association over those made by non-association dealers.
There was evidence that in addition there was an oral agreement that union
members would not work for non-association dealers. Decorative Stone Co.
v. Building Trades Council (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 333 (union
refused to work on non-union made artificial stone, which refusal the em-
ployers actively supported); United States v. International Fur Workers'
Union (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 100 F. (2d) 541 (in order to maintain wage
standards, union urged the formation of and agreed to cooperate with a
trade association, trade association then engaged in price fixing and "quota"
allocating); Borderland Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers (D. C. Ind.
1921) 275 Fed. 871 (union used dues which had been collected by check-off
system to finance organizing drive in non-union field); United States v.
Heating, Piping & Air C. Contr. Ass'n (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1940) 33 F.
Supp. 978 (association to operate closed shop, union to work only for mem-
bers of association) ; United States v. Lumber Institute of Allegheny County
(D. C. W. D. Pa. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 191.
71. Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
1927) 18 F. (2d) 333, 336: "Whatever may be said to justify what was
done upon grounds of social justice or economic welfare is not open to
consideration in this court. Decision is controlled by Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering." United States v. Painters' District Council No. 14 (D. C.
N. D. Ill. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 58: "The Court is unable to distinguish this
situation from the one of Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters' Ass'n."
Aff'd per curiam (1931) 284 U. S. 582, on authority of Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443, United States v. Brims (1926)
272 U. S. 549, and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters'
Ass'n (1927) 274 U. S. 37.
72. United States v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n (1941) 9 U. S.
L. Week 2485.
73. Mr. Arnold is confusing those activities illegal under the anti-trust
laws with those activities which may or may not be economically sound.
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v. Hutcheson, the facts alleged in the present indictment are
insufficient to charge a violation of the anti-trust laws even
though interstate commerce is restrained and the property
rights and security of the employers caught between the
warring unions are disregarded. We therefore sought dis-
missal of this case.
We must accept the decision of the Supreme Court to the
extent to which the Sherman Act may be used to remedy
such evils. This does not mean that we will abandon or fail
to prosecute any case which does not fall within the Hutche-
son decision. [Italics supplied.]
What cases do not fall within the Hutcheson decision? Mr.
Arnold lists six types of labor restraints which he feels are not
expressly covered by the Hutcheson case :74
(1) The strike of one union against another union certi-
fied by the NLRB to be the only legitimate collective bar-
gaining agency with whom the employer can deal.7
(2) Strike to erect a tariff wall around a locality.10
(3) The exclusion of efficient methods of pre-fabricated
materials from building construction."
(4) The refusal of unions to allow small, independent
firms to remain in business.78
(5) The activities of unions in imposing and maintaining
artificially fixed prices to consumers.7 )
(6) The make work system. 0
The Anti-Trust Division, through Mr. Arnold, thus expresses
determination to bring under the scope of the anti-trust laws
every possible labor activity having ends which the Division does
74. 9 U. S. L. Week 2485, which also cites illustrations of these re-
straints.
75. Does Mr. Arnold mean to indicate that once a contract has been
consummated, members of a union, or employees can not engage in peaceful
picketing in order to disestablish a union that has proved to be economically
unsound in form, or dominated by persons furthering their own interests
rather than the employees' interests?
76. Does this mean that unions in an organized community can not boy-
cott non-union material from unorganized communities?
77. Does this mean that there can not be an agreement to adjust to
technological change?
78. Does Mr. Arnold mean that he will go so far as to protect the "con-
tracting-out" system which has been a notorious device to prevent unioniza-
tion and to create sweat shop conditions?
79. Does Mr. Arnold mean that any union activity tending to eliminate
price differentiation arising from non-union working standards is illegal?
80. This type is so broad that it could include a union's demand for
shorter hours. Does Mr. Arnold propose to remove from the collective
bargaining process such questions as the number of men necessary to do
a particular job and the rate of an assembly line that can best be main-
tained from the viewpoint of efficiency and health of employees?
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not favor economically. Two comments upon the above classifi-
cation of "restraints" will be sufficient to indicate that the Anti-
Trust Division is endeavoring to negate the effectiveness of the
instant decision. First, the generalizations are so vague that they
permit prosecution of almost any labor activity.,1 Mr. Arnold,
instead of endeavoring to allow expression to the legislative will
as has the Supreme Court, now seeks to restrict all activities not
expressly covered by both the court and the legislature. Second,
contrary to the court's statements that objectives sought by the
use of particular activities are not to be considered in determin-
ing the legality or illegality of a combination in restraint of
commerce,8 2 Mr. Arnold condemns the enumerated restraints on
grounds of the union's aims.
* * * the test that the Department urged the courts to adopt
was this: that the question of whether the privilege of col-
lective bargaining has been illegally used depends upon the
objective for which it is used. If that objective is legitimate,
then there is no unreasonable restraint of trade.83
And conversely, if the objective is illegitimate, by the standards
of the Anti-Trust Division (which the court did not adopt in the
instant case), then the accompanying peaceful picketing, per-
suasion or publicising is banned. If this proposed test should be
adopted, the guarantees found in the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
in the National Labor Relations Act would be entirely circum-
vented.84 Perhaps the greatest support which Mr. Arnold can
find in Supreme Court labor decisions is the dictum in the instant
case in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicates that the motives
of a union may determine legality if there is a combination with
a non-labor group.
81. Not only are these classifications vague, but experience points to
the prosecution by the Anti-Trust Division of at least one case inconsistent
with Mr. Arnold's declared policy. The Anti-Trust Division, after the letter
to the Central Labor Union of Indianapolis on Nov. 20, 1939, continued to
prosecute a union for endeavoring to unionize three non-union plants, United
States v. Gold (C. C. A. 2, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 236. This case cannot be
fitted into any of the five categories which were supposedly guiding the
Anti-Trust Division in the prosecution of labor unions under the anti-trust
laws. See Landis, The Apex Case (1941) 26 Cornell L. Q. 191, 211.
82. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443;
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n (1927) 274
U. S. 37; Boyle v. United States (C. C. A. 7, 1919) 259 Fed. 803; Consoli-
dated Term. Corp. v. Drivers, C. & H. Local Union 639 (D. C. D. C. 1940)
33 F. Supp. 645; Blankenship v. Kurfman (C. C. A. 7, 1938) 90 F. (2d)
450.
83. Arnold, The Bottlenecks of Business (1940) 248.
84. Note, The Folk-Law of Thurman Arnold (1939) 8 I. J. A. Bull. 53,
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. Not only is Mr. Arnold endeavoring to avoid legislative policy
in the courts by the use of vague classifications and a personally
redefined concept of "restraint of commerce"; he apparently de-
sires to give the Federal Trade Commission chancery powers
which have been denied the courts. 5 An indication of what
might be the result of such a policy, if it were adopted, is to be
found in the Federal Trade Commission's issuance of a cease and
desist order against the attempt of Local 383 of the Teamster's
Union and seven bakeries to interfere with the distribution of
bakery goods by "independent routemen. '8 6 The same sort of
situation was found in Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Val-
ley Farm Products87 in which case the Supreme Court held that
such practices could not be enjoined under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Consequently, and by force of the Hutcheson decision, such
activities on the union's part would not be violative of any law of
the United States (including the Federal Trade Commission
Act!) unless there existed a combination between the union and
a non-labor group. Here, however, the union instigated the
agreement as a part of a legitimate collective bargaining con-
tract, which provided that no bakery goods be sold to independent
routemen who were not operating prior to January 1, 1938.
Another circuitous endeavor to escape the effect of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act is to be found in some recent cases under the
Motor Carrier Act, which prohibits discrimination by a carrier
against the goods of any shipper. 8 If unionized employees of a
carrier refuse to handle the goods of a non-union shipper, a
refusal permitted by the collective bargaining contract with the
carrier, can the non-union shipper secure an injunction against
the carrier, requiring it, its agents, and its employees to handle
goods offered by the non-union shipper? One decision denied an
injunction on the ground that the Motor Carrier Act does not
suspend the Norris-LaGuardia Act.89 Two other courts, notwith-
standing the Norris-LaGuardia Act, issued temporary restraining
85. Mr. Arnold recently recommended to the Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee that power should be given to the Federal Trade Com-
mission to act as a master in chancery in anti-trust cases. 9 U. S. L. Week
2486, 2487.
86. In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., F. T. C. No. 3900 (1941) 9 U. S. L.
Week 2473.87. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products (1940)
311 U. S. 91.
88. Motor Carrier Act (1935) 49 Stat. 543, 564, c. 498, 49 U. S. C. A.(Supp. 1940) 322(c). See Flank Attack on Union Contracts (1941) 8
Labor Relations Rep. 4.
89. Southeastern Motor Lines v. Hoover Trucking Co. (D. C. N. D.
Tenn. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 390.
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orders." Continuation or extension of such indirect attacks upon
legitimate activities of labor unions and upon valid collective bar-
gaining contracts is subversion of the legislative policy relative
to labor unions, and should be severely condemned.
CONCLUSION
Although the instant decision greatly advances judicial reason-
ing relative to the questions of labor under the anti-trust laws,
with the exception of the dictum relative to combinations with
non-labor groups, its practical value may be defeated by present
defense and war preparation. Labor unions will, either volun-
tarily or by governmental compulsion, greatly curtail many activ-
ities which, under this decision, they would be able to utilize. It
is quite probable that the legislature will enact measures which
will limit the rights of labor in order to expedite production.
The courts will, of course, recognize legislative will in these mat-
ters. The permanent effect of these extraordinary conditions up-
on labor, should normalcy return, is a matter of speculation. But
whatever the effect may be, both legislature and judiciary will
do well to recognize realistically that emergency legislation is
enacted to meet a particular situation. The legislature in draft-
ing any possible enactment and the courts in construing the legis-
lation should keep in mind the occasions giving rise to this legis-
lation-and exigent restrictions upon labor should be confined
to these occasions. If this is not done, if either the legislature or
the judiciary confuse labor policy necessary to promulgate a pro-
gram of war preparation with a labor policy desirable in a de-
mocracy unshackled by war, the gains made over the last decade
of the half century since the enactment of the Sherman Act will
go for naught.
JOHN R. STOCKHAM.
90. Evans Line, Inc. v. 0. K. Trucking Co., Inc. (D. C. W. Va. 1940)
8 Labor Relations Rep. 4: Keystone Freight Lines, Inc. v. Pratt Thomas
Truck Lines (D. C. W. D. Okla. 1941) 8 Labor Relations Rep. 19.
1941] NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
